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Jurors' Evaluations of Expert
Testimony: Judging the Messenger
and the Message
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi6
Valerie P. Hans
Jurors are laypersons with no specific expert knowledge, yet they are
routinely placed in situations in which they need to critically evaluate complex
expert testimony. This paper examines jurors' reactions to experts who testify
in civil trials and the factors jurors identify as important to expert credibility.
Based on in-depth qualitative analyses of interviews with 55 jurors in 7 civil
trials, we develop a comprehensive model of the key factors jurors incorporate
into the process of evaluating expert witnesses and their testimony. Contrary
to the frequent criticism that jurors primarily evaluate expert evidence in
terms of its subjective characteristics, the results of our study indicate that
jurors consider both the messenger and the message in the course of evaluating
the expert's credibility.
In an insightful review of the use of expert evidence in litigation, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Professor Samuel Gross outlined the "essential para-
dox" of expert testimony: "We call expert witnesses to testify about matters
that are beyond the ordinary understanding of lay people (that is both the
major practical justification and a formal legal requirement for expert testi-
mony), and then we ask lay judges and jurors to judge their testimony"
(1991, 1182).
How does a layperson cope with the challenge? Some of the sharpest
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attacks on the jury as an institution center on jurors' difficulties with expert
evidence. Popular commentator Peter Huber's argument that the courts
have fallen victim to "junk science" (1991) is based on his view that when
juries and credulous judges attempt to evaluate expert scientific testimony
in the courtroom, many are unable to separate sound science from fanciful
fiction. The result: huge awards that are said to be based more on the jury's
sympathy than on credible scientific evidence linking a defendant's actions
or products to a plaintiff's injuries. Few jury scholars would go so far as Huber
to agree that jurors are unable to evaluate scientific evidence (see Cecil,
Hans, and Wiggins 1991; Brief Amici Curiae 1998). But surveys of judges
and jurors themselves indicate that jurors find the task of evaluating expert
evidence to be challenging.
The question of juror understanding of expert evidence has aroused a
great deal of interest in the legal community. Litigators often present key
trial evidence through expert witnesses. These experts are given wide lati-
tude in their testimony, and their ability to convey complex points to a jury
can make or break a case. Aside from their own experiences, hunches, and
intuitions, trial lawyers have limited systematic information available to pre-
dict how the jury will receive expert evidence.
Standards of admissibility of expert testimony also rely on unexamined
premises about how jurors respond to expert witnesses. The United States
Supreme Court has concluded that trial judges should act as gatekeepers of
expert testimony, making preliminary scientific evaluations before allowing
an expert to testify in the presence of the jury (Daubert v. Merrel Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 [1993]; General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 [1997]; Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 [1999]). One key as-
sumption underlying the Daubert line of cases is that jurors might be duped
by a persuasive but untrustworthy expert who testifies about matters that
are not based on sound scientific principles or data.
Social scientists have begun to study laypersons' responses to expert
testimony. Given the public debate, it is not surprising that much of the
work is focused on how well jurors are able to understand expert testimony.
In addition, projects using jury simulation methodology have explored how
mock jurors react to expert testimony about, for example, statistical evi-
dence, the battered woman syndrome, or factors affecting eyewitness identi-
fication. However, there has been less work on jurors' reactions to the most
common types of expert evidence, such as medical testimony and economic
evidence. In addition, relatively few studies to date have examined in detail
how real jurors respond to real experts in the context of real trials.
This article presents new information about how jurors respond to ex-
pert witnesses and their testimony. The article fills some of the gaps in prior
research by examining the jurors' reactions to experts who testified in actual
civil trials. In our analysis of transcripts of semi-structured interviews with
actual jurors, we employ systematic qualitative methodology to develop a
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comprehensive model of the key factors that jurors consider as they assess
experts and expert testimony. We conclude that both the characteristics of
the expert (the "messenger") and the substantive and stylistic aspects of the
testimony itself (the "message") contribute significantly to the overall im-
pact of expert testimony on jurors.
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT JURORS' REACTIONS TO
EXPERTS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY?
Before describing our own study, we will assess what we already know
about jurors' evaluation of expert witnesses and expert testimony. Much of
the existing research is focused around the question of whether jurors are
competent to critically assess and evaluate the claims and technical informa-
tion provided by experts.
In their sample of criminal jury trials from the 1950s, Kalven and Zeisel
(1966) found that experts testified relatively infrequently. Just one case in
four included an expert, typically a medical doctor and usually a prosecution
expert witness (Kalven and Zeisel 1966, 139-40, tables 37 and 38). Analyz-
ing questionnaires from the judges presiding over jury trials, Kalven and
Zeisel found just one case, an embezzlement trial of a city bookkeeper that
included expert testimony about bookkeeping, in which the judge stated
that the jury's verdict was linked to its inability to understand the case. The
jurors were all poorly educated, according to the judge, and "the jury simply
was not able to understand the case" (Kalven and Zeisel 1966, 152-53). In
the judge's eyes, the defendant's expert witness presented testimony that
"bordered on perjury," and he was charged with disciplinary action at the
time of the trial, a damaging fact that the judge knew but the jury did not
(1966, 153 n.7).
Compared to jurors from the 1950s, jurors today face more scientific
and technical evidence presented through expert testimony. In contempo-
rary criminal cases, experts testify in a sizeable minority of felony trials
(Gross 1991). Civil cases, on the other hand, appear to include a greater
number of experts. Samuel Gross analyzed the frequency of appearances by
experts in 529 California civil jury trials in the mid-1980s and discovered
that they testified in the vast majority (86%) of them, with an average of
3.3 experts per trial. The greatest frequency of experts was in personal injury
trials, especially medical malpractice and product liability (Gross 1991). The
Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice compiled a larger data set of
6,573 California civil trials from 1980 to 1985. In the cases covered by the
Rand data set, experts testified at the rate of 3.7 experts per trial (Gross
1990; Gross and Syverud 1996).
The Federal Judicial Center undertook surveys of U.S. district court
judges and attorneys during the 1990s to obtain information about the use
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of expert testimony in federal trials pre- and post-Daubert (Krafka et al.
2002). Judges reported information on their most recent trial involving ex-
pert witnesses. Trials with experts averaged three experts per case in 1991;
by 1998 the average was 4.1. Across the multiple surveys, about 40% of the
experts were in medicine or mental health; 25% possessed business, finan-
cial, or legal specialties; a similar number specialized in engineering/process/
safety; and the remainder had other scientific specialties. The single most
frequent type of expert was an economist, accounting for 11% of all experts
testifying in these federal trials.
Is jury comprehension detrimentally affected by the large quantity of
expert testimony or the increased complexity of the testimony that juries
must evaluate? Goodman, Greene, and Loftus (1985) interviewed judges
and jurors about problems jurors face in complex cases. When jurors had
difficulty, judges most frequently pointed to problems in understanding the
evidence, especially expert testimony. Conflicting expert testimony from
highly qualified medical witnesses was seen as particularly difficult for jurors.
The authors outlined several possible approaches that jurors might take to
resolve conflicting expert testimony. One was to ignore all expert testimony
and evaluate the case on other grounds. In their interviews with jurors, the
authors found that this was rare. Jurors were more likely to try to unravel
the factors leading to the contradictory testimony, or to reach their own
conclusions about the content of the testimony. In some cases they also
made judgments about which expert was the most credible and relied on
that expert's testimony. For example, in an asbestos case, one expert impres-
sed jurors because of his credentials and prominent position in the field.
The authors observed that, it seems that "jurors in product cases often make
these kinds of judgments-personal judgments about the experts and not
about the information relayed" (Goodman et al. 1985, 68).
The American Bar Association Special Committee of Jury Compre-
hension (1989) undertook an in-depth study of jury decision making in four
highly complex cases, three of which included expert evidence. Judges, ju-
rors, and attorneys in those cases were interviewed, a questionnaire was dis-
tributed to jurors, alternate jurors were formed into mock juries, and their
deliberations were videotaped. Jurors rejected experts who seemed to be
hired guns, and accepted as the most influential those who tended to be
directly involved with the parties (such as a personal physician) and those
who presented understandable testimony.
Two additional case studies focused on jurors' understanding of expert
evidence, their attitudes toward the experts, and the potential impact ex-
perts had on decision making. Rand Corporation researchers Selvin and
Picus (1987) observed a complex tort trial in Texas and interviewed the
six-member jury at the end of the trial. The researchers reported that the
jury's recollection and understanding of specific scientific and medical facts
in the case contained several errors (e.g., the jury did not understand the
HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry  444 2003
Jurors' Evaluations of Expert Testimony 445
relationship between smoking and the development of breathing problems
experienced by the plaintiffs), which led jurors to discard the testimony of
the medical experts who had testified on this point. Selvin and Picus con-
cluded that "[clonfronted with so much complex and confusing information,
the jurors tended to evaluate the credibility of these witnesses in large part
on their personal characteristics rather than on the information they pre-
sented" (1987, 27).
In another complex tort case, Sanders (1993) conducted posttrial inter-
views with four out of twelve jurors. When asked to rate the experts in the
case, jurors expressed contradictory views and had problems distinguishing
among the experts. They also discounted the expert opinion in the case as
the product of hired guns. Sanders reported that jurors seemed bored and
confused by the epidemiological evidence, which minimized its impact on
the jurors, and the three conflicting epidemiologists canceled each other out.
However, one expert caught their attention and received highly positive
evaluations because of his "pretty impressive" and "real good explanation"
(Sanders 1993, 62).
In contrast to work focusing predominantly on the competence of ju-
rors to understand expert testimony, Shuman, Champagne, and Whitaker
have undertaken a more comprehensive look at juror reactions to experts
(Champagne, Shuman, and Whitaker 1992; Shuman and Champagne 1997;
Shuman, Champagne, and Whitaker 1996a, 1996b; Shuman, Whitaker, and
Champagne 1994). In a series of opinion surveys and other studies, the au-
thors examined the range of factors that may affect juror reactions to experts.
The response rates were generally low in these studies, but the results are
intriguing. Although the majority of lawyers and experts surveyed by Shu-
man and his colleagues expressed some confidence in the jury's ability to
understand expert testimony, they typically saw jurors as less capable than
judges when it came to evaluating it (Shuman et al. 1994). The experts
emphasized that jurors placed more importance on personality and physical
attractiveness in assessing expert credibility than did judges (Shuman et al.
1994). Here, the experts follow the tradition of believing that jurors are
much more susceptible to various biases compared to judges, who are seen
as being able to rise above human prejudices (but see Guthrie, Rachlinski,
and Wistrich 2001; Landsman and Rakos 1994).
The majority of jurors who participated in the surveys agreed that ex-
pert testimony was crucial to the outcome of their cases (Champagne et al.
1992). In contrast to the experts' perceptions, however, very few jurors re-
ported that an expert's pleasant personality or physical appearance influ-
enced their decision (Champagne et al. 1992; Shuman et al. 1994). Rather,
they emphasized the expert's ability to convey technical information non-
technically, the expert's willingness to draw firm conclusions, the expert's
reputation as a leading expert, and the expert's impressive educational cre-
dentials as more influential (Champagne et al. 1992; Shuman et al. 1994).
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Shuman et al. (1994) concluded that the expert's field and occupation and
jurors' demographic characteristics had no significant role in assessments of
experts' credibility. On the other hand, the party who retained the expert
was important, as was the expert's qualifications, familiarity with the case,
quality of reasoning, and impartiality.
In addition to these general surveys or assessments of jurors and expert
testimony, a number of studies focus on the use of experts in particular types
of trials. Vidmar, for example, studied jury performance in North Carolina
medical malpractice cases. On the basis of postdeliberation interviews with
jurors, he concluded that they "come to understand the adversary system
and on the whole evaluate expert witnesses in the light of this perspective"
(Vidmar 1995, 173). Thus, they raised questions about the objectivity of
experts who were hired guns or were close colleagues of the defendants, and
they discussed possible motives of experts in other cases. Jurors also tried to
understand the content of the testimony. In one case, once lawyers and
experts explained the issues, four out of seven jurors interviewed "appeared
to clearly understand the technical evidence" (Vidmar 1994, 903). How-
ever, some jurors tended to rely on general impressions over the content of
the testimony, and "when there are competent experts on both sides, and
they offer contradictory or confusing opinions, jurors may resolve the differ-
ences by relying on general impressions of character and veracity" (Vidmar
1995, 172).
Jury simulation studies offer another approach to examining juror reac-
tions to expert testimony (Vidmar and Diamond 2001). Jacoubovitch et al.
(1977) examined the effect on jurors of direct testimony from an expert
versus mediated testimony, in which an attorney read the expert's testimony
verbatim. Respondents in the direct-testimony condition evaluated experts
as more confident and competent, and reported having a clearer impression
of the expert than did the respondents in the mediated-testimony condition.
DeWitt, Richardson, and Warner (1997) further studied the impact of the
source of expertise on mock jurors' perceptions and decision making. In an
experiment involving novel scientific evidence, participants were persuaded
by unreliable evidence that would fulfill neither the Frye test nor the Daubert
criterion (DeWitt et al. 1997).
Lawyer tactics or "dirty tricks" of cross-examination may affect evalua-
tions of an expert's credibility. Kassin, Williams, and Saunders (1990) found
that a question during the cross-examination in a simulated rape trial im-
plying something negative about the reputation of the expert, although un-
corroborated by other evidence and even denied, diminished the credibility
of an expert witness. In contrast, Kovera et al. (1994) reported in their
experimental study of a child sexual abuse case that the strength of cross-
examination was unrelated to the credibility of the expert witnesses. Fur-
thermore, their study yielded important results with respect to the different
types of expert evidence (syndrome, witness credibility, and anatomically
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detailed dolls) used in a child sexual abuse case. In particular, although ex-
pert evidence had an impact on the mock jurors' judgments regardless of
type, syndrome evidence (probabilistic in nature) was less likely to be re-
called than either of the two other types of expert evidence, was evaluated
as less important and less helpful, and was found to result in less positive
ratings of the expert and her testimony.
Other mock studies have evaluated the impact of various types of expert
testimony on jurors' opinions. Diamond and Casper (1992) presented jurors
with several videotape versions of an antitrust price-fixing case varying be-
tween the statistical model and the concrete yardstick model of expert testi-
mony. Jurors did not perceive either model as more persuasive than the
other, but they viewed the statistical expert as having greater expertise while
being less clear. The positive and negative characteristics neutralized each
other, however, so neither expert outdid the other when the jury rated the
plaintiff and defense cases nor when they awarded damages.
Juror comprehension of statistical or probabilistic evidence, undoubt-
edly among the most complex and difficult expert evidence, was a topic of
several other studies. Thompson and Schumann (1987) examined how
mock jurors evaluate statistical evidence in criminal cases. They concluded
that the respondents were susceptible to fallacious statistical reasoning, and
had difficulty detecting flaws in arguments based on statistics. In their stud-
ies, mock jurors often underestimated or overestimated the value of statisti-
cal evidence. Several other mock juror studies show that mock jurors may
underutilize statistical experts (Faigman and Baglioni 1998; Smith et al.
1996; Schklar and Diamond 1999).
Another set of jury simulation studies focused on experts who testified
about battered woman syndrome or rape trauma syndrome. Brekke and Bor-
gida (1988) found that when two opposing experts on rape trauma syndrome
presented evidence, mock jurors' responses were similar to the condition
when no expert testimony was presented, suggesting that jurors may resolve
the issue of conflicting testimonies by ignoring both of them (and resorting
to their prior belief) or by accepting the one that supports their prior belief.
Studies by Follingstad et al. (1989) and Finkel, Meister, and Lightfoot
(1991) reached a similar conclusion: Presence of an expert on battered
woman syndrome did not alter the verdict reached by mock jurors in crimi-
nal cases, but it did influence the way jurors perceived the case. By contrast,
Schuller's studies found that expert evidence altered jurors' evaluations of
the defendant's perceptions and resulted in greater leniency in their verdicts
(Schuller 1990; Schuller and Vidmar 1992).
Cooper and his colleagues (Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel 1996) explored
the importance of testimony's complexity by varying its complexity and the
strength of the experts' credentials. They found that personal characteristics
of the experts, such as their credentials, played a significant role only when
the evidence was complex and the mock jurors had difficulty evaluating it.
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Cooper et al. (1996) hypothesized that mock jurors confronted with difficult
testimony would shift from central processing of the evidence, which in-
volves careful critical analysis of the content and quality of the argument,
toward peripheral processing, in which jurors rely on shortcuts and heuristics
to assess the validity of the testimony. Cooper and Neuhaus (2000) under-
took three additional experiments to examine that hypothesis. In the first,
mock jurors who heard testimony of a highly paid expert with high creden-
tials-potentially fitting the profile of a hired gun-rated the expert as less
likable, less believable, less trustworthy, less honest, and more annoying,
compared to the mock jurors in any of the remaining three conditions (ex-
perts with low pay, high credentials; low pay, low credentials; high pay, low
credentials). In a second study, Cooper and Neuhaus varied the pay and the
frequency of testimony by an expert with high credentials. Mock jurors
showed more trust in the novice experts than in the experts who testified
frequently. In particular, they were the least convinced by, and least likely
to trust, the experienced expert with high pay. The third in the series of
experiments examined the effect of the pay and the complexity of testimony
on the mock jurors' perceptions of trustworthiness and believability of a
frequently testifying expert with high credentials. The results suggest a sig-
nificant interaction between the pay and the complexity of testimony.
While in the case of simple testimony the expert's pay induced no differ-
ences in the degree of expert's trustworthiness, when the testimony was com-
plex, the expert who received the highest pay was evaluated as the least
trustworthy. Cooper and Neuhaus concluded that jurors shifted from central
to peripheral processing under cognitively challenging conditions. However,
Vidmar and Diamond (2001) offer the alternative explanation that mock
jurors may have centrally processed the testimony but rejected it when the
expert's motives were suspicious and the testimony was interpreted as pur-
posefully confusing.
Opinions about expert witnesses may be affected not only by respon-
dents' trial experiences, but also by their out-of-court experiences with ex-
perts of a particular type (e.g., physicians, economists; Saks and Wissler
1984) and their life experiences in general. In surveys of the public, expert
witnesses (together with the police) were rated as the least dishonest and
the most confident, likable, and believable of the witnesses in the trials (i.e.,
defendants, victims, eyewitnesses; Linz and Penrod 1982). Respondents' ed-
ucational level did not affect their ratings of experts' honesty, but it did
affect ratings of their competence (Linz and Penrod, 1982); more educated
jurors were less likely to believe an expert.
Two experimental studies examined the effect of gender on the percep-
tions of the experts' believability. Vondergeest, Honts, and Devitt (1993)
found no effect of either the expert's gender or the juror's gender on the
verdict. Similarly, Memon and Shuman (1998) reported no differences in
jurors' perceptions of female versus male expert witnesses, nor did ratings
HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry  448 2003
Jurors' Evaluations of Expert Testimony 449
of experts provided by female and male jurors differ significantly. Although
the researchers reported that evaluations of an expert's reasoning and objec-
tivity were not influenced by the expert's race and gender, they found an
interaction effect of gender and race on perceptions of the expert's believa-
bility. For example, contrary to their expectations, a black female expert
was evaluated as the most believable (Memon and Shuman 1998).
This review of existing research indicates that only a modest number
of studies have examined actual jurors' reactions to experts. Moreover, these
studies with actual jurors typically have included only one or a very few
cases. In addition, the literature on the whole has focused on a small subset
of types of cases, such as complex cases or medical malpractice trials. Some
of the studies that have obtained the reactions of actual jurors have suffered
from relatively low response rates of 20% or 30%, which raises questions
about potential selection bias and imperils generalization of the results. Fur-
thermore, the use of structured, quantitative methodology does not allow
the respondents to explain the issues; rather, it restricts respondents' answers
to the offered ones.
While providing important insights into the phenomenon of expert
testimony and its impact on jurors, mock jury research takes place in a con-
trolled environment, and it typically uses only one or two experts in each
study. The differences between the conditions in mock jury research (e.g.,
complex and simple testimony, high and low credentials) are seldom so ex-
aggerated in real life. Depending on the study design, mock jurors, unlike
actual jurors, may make individual decisions, may not engage in group delib-
eration, may not see and hear experts in person, may receive no judicial
instructions, and lack the overall sense of finality that accompanies a verdict
and the pressures and motivations associated with real jury service. Samples
are relatively small and the subjects used in such studies-often college stu-
dents-have frequently been nonrepresentative of typical jury pools in
terms of age, education, class, race, and experience.
Further, the studies to date have tended to focus on a limited range of
expertise. While the effects of psychological experts, such as those testifying
about battered women or eyewitnesses, have been examined frequently, the
more mundane (but more common) medical experts in actual trials have
received considerably less attention. For instance, in the Gross data set,
psychological experts comprised 3% of all expert witnesses; in the Rand
study, that figure was 4%. In contrast, medical doctors constituted respec-
tively 49% and 56% of the Gross and Rand cases (Gross 1991). Medical
experts account for about half the experts in federal trials (Krafka et al.
2002). Although this issue has not yet been extensively explored, jurors
may respond quite differently to expert psychological claims about human
behavior, which they may feel they are more able to judge independently,
than to medical or economic testimony (Shuman et al. 1996b), so the over-
emphasis on psychological testimony may be misleading. Furthermore, crim-
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inal and civil cases present somewhat different environments for expert
witnessing, and there is a need to explore both domains. For example, Casper
and Diamond (1993) have observed that strong values that jurors bring to
death penalty cases may limit the range of potential impact of an expert,
whereas in civil trials involving matters like antitrust, their values may be
less significant.
This article presents a detailed model of how jurors respond to a range
of expert witnesses through an in-depth qualitative analysis of interviews
with actual jurors. As part of a larger study of juries in business and corporate
civil cases (Hans 2000), we had available a large number of transcripts of
semi-structured interviews with civil jurors. Among other information, ju-
rors provided in their own words the reactions they had to experts who
testified in the real cases they decided.
In this article we examine the jurors' impressions and comments on a
range of expert witnesses in a number of cases, and whenever possible, we
contrast and compare opinions of jurors who evaluated the credibility of the
same expert in the case. By analyzing interviews from civil jurors in business
tort and medical malpractice cases, we attempt to determine what factors
jurors take into account in assessing the credibility of the expert. Using these
factors in a systematic way, we provide a model of expert witness credibility.
The results suggest that jurors are affected by both the personal characteris-
tics of the expert (the messenger) and by the substantive and stylistic aspects
of the expert testimony (the message).
RESEARCH METHOD
Cases and Participants
This study of jurors' evaluations of experts, based primarily on a total
of 55 tape-recorded interviews, is part of a larger interview study examining
the reactions of 269 jurors in cases with business and corporate parties (Hans
2000). The researchers identified every civil jury trial that involved a busi-
ness or corporate party during a one-year period in a state court of general
jurisdiction. Jurors from these trials were contacted, and those who agreed to
participate in the study were interviewed about how they reached a decision
in the case. The overall response rate of the jurors was 64%, with an average
of 7 out of 12 jurors on each case participating in the study. Two questions
specifically tapping attitudes about experts were included in a postinterview
questionnaire completed by all 269 jurors. We report the data below.
In addition, to examine jurors' evaluations of experts in depth and de-
tail, we selected seven cases from the total of 36 cases, involving a total of 55
jurors, for further analysis of interview transcripts. We wanted to undertake
concentrated qualitative analysis of each of the juror's comments about ex-
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perts, and thus needed to limit our inquiry to a smaller number of transcripts.
Further, since contract disputes are less likely to include expert testimony
(Gross 1991), we decided to exclude them from our analysis. Finally, we
were particularly interested in how jurors dealt with conflicting expert testi-
mony, and so selected cases in which more experts, and opposing experts,
had testified.
This final set of seven cases included two medical malpractice cases,
two workplace injury cases, a product liability case, an asbestos case, and a
motor vehicle accident case. All cases included a corporate defendant. In
every trial, both sides presented expert witnesses. The total number of ex-
perts in the cases was 33; the number of experts in each case ranged from
3 to 6, with an average of 4.7. The vast majority of the experts (25 of 33)
were physicians. The remaining experts were a physical therapist, a labora-
tory technician, two architects, an engineer, and three economists. The total
number of jurors in the seven cases was 55. Although not every juror com-
mented on every expert who testified at his or her trial, the total number
of potential juror-expert observations represented by our sample is 256.
Procedure
Jurors were interviewed individually using a semi-structured interview
format that took about an hour to complete. They were asked to give their
reactions to the parties, attorneys, and evidence in the case; to answer a
series of questions about how they decided the verdict and any award; and
to discuss the factors that affected their decision. They then completed a
questionnaire that tapped general attitudes toward litigation, business, and
responsibility. Two questions about experts appeared on this questionnaire.
A list of witnesses, including expert witnesses, was obtained from public
records, and was shown to each juror during the interview. Jurors were asked
to go through the list and summarize the testimony and their reactions to
each witness, especially if he or she provided what the juror considered to
be important testimony. Typical follow-up questions and probes included,
"What did he [the expert] have to say?" "In what way did that affect you?"
"What is your impression of her?" "Did that influence his credibility?" "Were
the experts for the plaintiff or the experts for the defendant more credible?"
"Was any of the evidence she [the expert] presented difficult to understand?"
Due to the semi-structured format of the interview, the wording of
questions sometimes varied, and different probes were used depending on
the nature of the case, the testimony, and the juror. Most comments about
expert witnesses were made during this "list of witnesses" portion of the
interview, but comments about expert testimony were also made at later
points as well. We reviewed the entire interview transcript to ensure that
all comments about experts were included in our analysis.
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To determine which witnesses listed in the public record were experts,
we relied on the definition provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
the collective reports of the jurors in a particular case. Because the witness
lists contained errors, as we discovered in interviewing the jurors, we relied
on the interviews rather than the public records for our final classification
of a witness as an expert. We did not require that a person have an advanced
degree to be considered an expert, although if a witness was listed as an
M.D. or a Ph.D., that eased our task of locating the experts. We used juror
interviews to determine which witnesses provided special expert knowledge
on the subject matter of the lawsuit and thus should be identified as experts.
Of course, medical doctors who were defendants were not counted as ex-
perts, even though their testimony was at times complex and technical.
Experts who testified in these cases were mostly men (31 out of 33).
We inferred that the large majority of experts were Caucasian, on the basis
of jurors' comments and experts' last names. Only one expert witness was
identified by jurors as African American; another was described as foreign.
ANALYSIS
Questionnaire Responses
Responses of the full sample of 269 jurors to the two questionnaire
items about experts are displayed in table 1. The responses to these items
should alleviate concerns that citizens enter the jury box prone to unques-
tioning acceptance of expert evidence. Instead, a good deal of skepticism about
experts is shown in the jurors' responses to the two items from the question-
naire. For example, seven of ten jurors either agreed or strongly agreed with
the statement that "lawyers can always find an expert who will back up their
client's point ofview, no matter what it is."Just one of every ten jurors disagreed
with this statement. At the very least, the jurors' responses contradict the idea
TABLE 1
Jurors' Views of Experts
SA A N D SDQuestionnaire Item (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Lawyers can always find an expert who will back up 16 56 15 10 2
their client's point of view, no matter what.
There's a lot of disagreement among experts in 12 64 16 8 0
most professions.
NoTEs: Based on responses of 269 civil jurors. SA = strongly agree; A = agree; N = neither
agree nor disagree; D = disagree; SD = strongly disagree.
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that jurors are highly gullible and that they overbelieve in experts. Jurors had
a similar reaction to the second item, on disagreement among experts. As
many as 76% agreed that "there's a lot of disagreement among experts in most
professions." Again this suggests that jurors have a more sanguine view of
expertise than perhaps has been appreciated.
Because the items on experts were included in a broader questionnaire,
it was possible to determine whether other attitudes or demographic charac-
teristics were related to these views of experts. The strongest relationship
was with an attitude scale, the Litigation Crisis Scale, which measured the
extent to which a juror believed that there was a litigation crisis and a sub-
stantial amount of frivolous litigation (see Hans 2000; Hans and Lofquist
1994). Jurors who showed the greatest suspicion of experts also tended to
believe that there were many illegitimate lawsuits. The correlation between
the Litigation Crisis Scale and the item "Lawyers can always find an expert
who will back up their client's point of view, no matter what it is" was .32,
p < .001; and the correlation between the Litigation Crisis Scale and the
item "There's a lot of disagreement among experts in most professions" was
.21, p < .001. The correlations are of modest size but statistically significant.
Those jurors who regularly doubt the fairness of the world also seem
to be more dubious about the expertise claims of professions. Put another
way, jurors who see themselves as efficacious and the world as a basically
agreeable place are more likely to grant legitimacy to claims advanced by
litigants and, in turn, to be more supportive of expert witnesses.
Logistic regression analyses examined whether there were any links be-
tween jurors' demographic characteristics and their general views of experts.
We analyzed the potential impact of the jurors' age, gender, education, reli-
gion, income, race, marital status, employer type (whether the juror was
employed by a major corporation), and union membership. Just one demo-
graphic variable, gender, was linked significantly to views of experts. Fully
82% of men jurors agreed that lawyers can always find a compliant expert,
compared to 64% of women jurors. Another way of expressing the gender
difference is in terms of relative odds of agreeing with the statement. The
odds that a male juror would agree are 4.62, while the odds that a female
juror would agree are 1.78. In a reduced logistic regression model of lawyers
finding experts who would agree as a function of gender, the estimated logis-
tic regression coefficient for gender is -. 940, p < .01 (-2LL = 307.46,
p < .01). Gender was not significantly linked to perceptions of disagreement
among experts in the professions, however.
Thus, at least for these general statements about experts testifying in
trials, the demographic characteristics of the jurors appear to play only a
modest role. These results converge with those of Shuman and his colleagues
(1996a) in their survey of Dallas, Texas, civil jurors. Their telephone survey
found that no demographic factor was significantly associated with civil ju-
rors' assessments of experts in cases they decided.
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Interview Results
The questionnaire data provide general information suggesting that ju-
rors are somewhat skeptical of expert witnesses. The more unique analysis
we offer, however, lies in our work with the specific comments jurors made
about the experts who testified in their trials. In conducting a systematic
qualitative analysis of jurors' comments, we took an inductive strategy iden-
tified as the "grounded theory" approach (Strauss 1987; Marshall and Ross-
man 1989). This method is widely used in the social sciences, but to our
knowledge has not yet been employed in evaluating jurors' reactions to ex-
perts or to other aspects of evidence and trials. We began with all of the
jurors' comments about experts, sorted and loosely categorized them, and
resorted and recategorized them several times until most of the comments
fit in our category scheme. Our aim was to summarize the factors that jurors
spontaneously mentioned when they discussed experts and expert testimony.
One advantage of this analytic approach is that the jurors' comments
help to determine the nature of the categories. The grounded theory ap-
proach thus "grounds" the model and category development in the original
words and expressions of the jurors. This may be contrasted to other analytic
approaches in which the researcher creates a set of categories and assesses
the extent to which the study participants fit those preordained categories.
The current methodology does, however, have some limitations. First,
the interviews necessarily took place after the trial, and some psychological
research suggests that people may not be fully accurate in describing their
decision making after the fact and in identifying the factors that influenced
their cognitive processes (Nisbett and Ross 1980). Memory problems can
occur, although we attempted to minimize them by providing a list of the
witnesses for each case. Another shortcoming is that jurors might have ad-
justed their responses to present themselves in a socially desirable light or
to maximize consistency with the outcome of the trial. These factors should
be kept in mind. Even so, the data provide a unique and complementary
perspective to prior research on this topic.
In the following discussion, we provide the thrust of jurors' comments
about expert witness testimony organized in the form of categories related
to either the personal aspects ("the messenger") or the testimony ("the mes-
sage"). Before embarking on such an analytical journey, we provide the
reader with several examples that illustrate the complexity of the jurors'
comments.
Jurors' Views of the "Good" Expert and the "Bad" Expert
We begin our analysis with some illustrations of the ways in which
jurors characterized "good" and "bad" expert witnesses. The examples pro-
vide some of the flavor of jurors' complex and multifaceted evaluations.
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The "Good Expert"
Being a "good" expert, the jurors in the cases suggest, does not depend
on only one characteristic or feature. As the following examples show, a
selected set of characteristics must blend together well:
J: He was an older doctor who [was] well versed. He didn't appear to
be somebody who did a lot of testifying in court, and he was a practicing
doctor. And he was very good. He explained everything to us in terms
that we would understand. I have a back injury myself, and it was kind
of interesting. In fact, I said to my wife later, "I wish I had known [him]
before. I would've rather had him operate on me than the guy who did
it." But [he] was very good. And he was very believable. The jury be-
lieved him.
In one of the medical malpractice cases that featured conflicting expert
testimony, several jurors explained why they trusted one medical expert
more than the other:
J: [she] was a witness for the plaintiff. She seemed to me a very intelli-
gent person. She had backup documents to go along with everything
she was saying .... She was the one I felt was the most credible. She
was able to field the answers very well from the defendants and to have
information to prove that what she was saying was the way it was....
I put more credibility in what she said.
Several jurors in another case evaluated one medical doctor as being
extremely good as an expert witness. In fact, one juror said that this expert
"was probably the witness that decided the case for the plaintiff." This is
how the jurors explained what the characteristics of a "good" expert witness
are:
J: [he] was a neurologist .... He was just excellent and convincing,
and he could speak to the court and the jury in lay terms .... He really
made things very clear. And I believe he does some teaching, and he
was in fact teaching us, showing us, you know, what the systems were,
what an X ray looks like in one case and what it looks like in another
case.... And [he] made himself very clear.
J: [he] was very intelligent-if I remember correctly, with a bowtie.
That's how I remember. Anyway, he was the one. He showed, he broke
things down, he explained to us in detail what the lung was like. I
mean he drew pictures; . . . they had a little model [of the lung] there
with all the parts that fail .... He showed us where it was; ... he told
us basically that if it was a nodule, if it was a pulmonary blood clot, it
would look like this. If it was cancer, it would be shaped differently,
and gave us all kinds of different examples of that. Came across as very
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much of a specialist, very intelligent, very believable. And he made it
interesting because he explained it so much. He really could explain
it well. I guess he's a teacher maybe too.
J: He was so interesting. He explained everything to us at our level, at
a layman's level. We could understand, so it really helped. . . . Yes,
everybody understood him. I mean, there was just no question.., he
was very, very clear .... He did demonstrations and brought a model
and those kinds of things, so it was very interesting.
In another case-a negligence case involving a job-related injury-
two experts on building and building safety testified. Apparently, one expert
made a very strong positive impression on the jurors. Six out of the ten
jurors interviewed talked about this expert witness. The common thread
through all these comments was that the expert stood up to the attorney
on the cross-examination.
J: He was a very good witness in this case. A very good witness because
[the opposing attorney] said, "you mean to tell me that you know every-
thing about this book. Every OSHA regulation." "Yes, sir, I do." "Yes,
sir, I do." And he [the attorney] could knock every one of the other
witnesses down, but this man did not budge.
I: So they were both experts on building and building safety?
J: Yeah. Yeah... but the second one was far superb, I mean, you know,
he put the lawyers down. I mean he could tell the lawyer where to get
off. When he was naturally cross-examined ... this man was able to
tell the lawyers, "no offense, mind you, this is my line, so I'll tell you."
I mean this guy could just rattle stuff off that was off the top of his
head. He could give you facts and figures and run on and on forever,
you know, and there was just [no way of] putting him down.
J: __ was excellent. He knew his stuff. He knew the OSHA stan-
dards. He was very good. I think that he's from New York, and he was
very, very good because he teaches classes on the OSHA standards.
I: And the OSHA regulations-that man-he pretty much swayed
you?
J: Yeah, he did. He did. I like him. He testified really well. He knew
his stuff, and he didn't back down from [the attorney], and I liked that.
Most people would tend to back down if they're attacked, but he didn't.
He knew his stuff and he knew the rules. I just liked that. I thought,
he's not lying, and he's not hemming and hawing. He knows his stuff
and I liked that.
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The "Bad" Expert
Like the descriptions of "good" expert witnesses, the accounts of "bad"
expert witnesses also included several factors. Here are a few examples:
J: I think that he was the economist from the University - and he
was really deep and really boring, but you could tell from his testimony
that he was definitely being paid by the plaintiffs. He was very one-
sided and you could tell he really didn't get into studying [the case].
J: He was the thoracic surgeon with whom [the defendant in a medical
malpractice suit] worked in - hospital, and he was a disaster ...
for the defense, in my opinion, because he got very flustered and would
have to ask for questions to be repeated, which I felt, in many cases,
was just a stalling technique because the questions were, you know,
kind of turning the screw and putting him very much on the defense
in order to answer the question in a way that he didn't perjure himself
or incriminate [the defendant] . . . he was having a hard time. Very
difficult time.
An expert may be labeled as a "bad" witness because of the lawyers
too. In one case a juror complained that the lawyers in the case did not
explain the connection of the expert's testimony to the case. Several jurors
in another case reported that one expert, an economist, whose analysis was
supposed to help the jury determine the award, experienced serious problems
because the lawyers did not provide all the information to him:
J: He brought this person in from University _... the best univer-
sity ... but evidently, they didn't get the whole story across to what
this guy was supposed to represent .... The defense just ripped him
apart; . . . in fact, the whole jury got a good laugh out of this guy ...
economist, I think it was. And the information they gave him.., he
presented the case based on those figures and facts and stuff. Which
were wrong.... They gave him the wrong dates, so all of his figures
were off and everything.., it was a joke. Uh, but I felt sorry for [the]
economist, because it wasn't really his fault; his figures were so distorted.
A Model of Jurors' Reactions to Experts
Jurors' comments about experts' credibility can be classified into two
major types: comments about personal aspects of the expert and comments
HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry  457 2003
458 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
about the testimony. Regarding personal factors, comments may be catego-
rized as relating to the-expert's credentials, motives, or general impressions.
As for testimony factors, two broad categories are apparent: those pertaining
to the content and those relating to the style of the testimony. A graphic
depiction of these categories may be found in figure 1. Sometimes jurors use
one or more of these specific factors to judge an expert, or they may also
compare the credibility of one expert with the credibility of another expert
in the case.
The jurors' comments reveal that both the messenger and the message
are important for a decision about the credibility of an expert witness. Not
surprisingly, jurors associate the following with credible testimony: lack of
bias; good credentials; a pleasant personality; a clear, objective, focused, not
overly long presentation that utilizes diagrams and models; use of lay terms;
a presentation that is complete, consistent, and not too complex; knowl-
edgeability in the area of expertise; and familiarity with the case.
Table 2 presents data on comments made about experts organized by
categories presented in figure 1. According to these data, presentation style
and its various aspects were the most frequently discussed aspects of credibil-
ity (33.2%), followed by credentials (23.1%) and general impressions about
the experts (20.6%). These numbers offer only a rough guideline as to fre-
quency of particular types of comments, however, because of the semi-struc-
tured interview format (recall that not all questions were asked of all
respondents, and, when asked, the wording of the questions occasionally
differed). Nonetheless, one may observe from table 2 that the frequency of
remarks about these dimensions of experts varies from case to case.
Credentials
The first interaction a juror witnesses between an expert and an attor-
ney in the courtroom occurs when the attorney establishes the witness's
credentials. This was how one juror described the process:
J: Everybody they brought up, they went through their personal back-
grounds as far as where they grew up, where they went to school, and
service, when they started working at -, and medical doctors went
through the same thing, you know. Where they were from, where they
practiced at, where they went to school, how well they did in school,
and questions like that. They tried making an issue out of B-readers
who are people who view X rays, read from X rays.
Jurors notice the expert witnesses' credentials and judge accordingly.
During the interviews, jurors usually mentioned the specialty or the profes-
sion of a particular expert. Most of the time jurors also remembered the
name of the institution with which the expert was affiliated. One juror said,
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"I had complete confidence in what he said. This may reflect my confidence
in the university, I think."
A number of jurors described the expert's professional activity, such as
presenting papers at conferences and seminars and research activity. For
example, one juror said this about a medical expert testifying in a negligence
case: "He's a really old .... He was real influential and [conducted] some
of the research that had proven that this stuff [asbestos] was hazardous."
Similarly, "he had a lot of credentials; he was very influential as far as that,
made [the defendant in the medical malpractice case] look like a little, you
know, common surgeon."
Jurors considered formal education in a positive light. This does not
necessarily imply that they immediately dismissed an expert witness who
lacked formal education. For example, one juror did not seem to mind the
lack of the expert's formal education: "He was a biomechanical engineer,
but he had no degrees. It was all practical knowledge, which I feel in some
ways, I don't have a degree myself, but I thought that was very interesting."
Typically, the jurors who used credentials as a basis for their judgment
about credibility thought that experts with good credentials were credible
expert witnesses.
J: Some background was given about Dr. -, and he was on numer-
ous committees. I guess to establish himself as an expert, they presented
his involvement in the medical community. He was on some sort of
national review board for __ . That's one of the big things he was
involved in.
I: Did you find him to be a credible witness?
J: Yes.
I: Was his testimony important? In terms of calling into question what
Dr. - [the defendant in a medical malpractice suit] had done?
J: Yeah, it was.
Interestingly, having an expert witness with a long list of credentials
is not an automatic guarantee of credibility. Credentials were mostly men-
tioned and used as a factor when jurors compared the credibility of experts
from the same profession. When jurors did contrast the credentials of ex-
perts, however, they usually found little discrepancy. Typically, their conclu-
sion was that both of the experts were "pretty well respected doctors."
Nevertheless, the conclusion was not uniform; some jurors discerned differ-
ences in qualifications between two experts. But how did jurors evaluate
these credentials? How did they compare one expert witness to the other?
I: What about the medical people that testified for each side? Which
did you think was the more effective? The more credible?
J: Dr. __
I: Were there obvious differences between him and Dr. _ ?
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J: Well, first, the length of the testimony, I guess. With all the things
he's been involved in and everything .... whereas the other doctor
didn't seem to spend all that much time.
I: Dr. __'s credentials gave you a more favorable impression?
J: It felt easier for me to make a decision, hearing all his, uh, all his
thoughts on the case.
J: He did seminars all over, and he had, really had credentials as far
as.... Like I say, I don't know how he had time to do all this.
I: Now, did you think he was a pretty credible doctor?
J: Yes, I did. I thought he had good credentials, really.
-Most of the times credentials were not the only factors that made a
physician stand out. In one case, the credentials, the presentation style, and
the content of the testimony all pointed in the same direction, making it
easier for the juror to decide. Factors associated both with the messenger
and with the message were important:
J: Dr. -, I believe, was a specialist for the plaintiff, and he's [got]
quite a background; writing books, and medications, and speaking, and
an authority on that problem. I was impressed with him.
I: What was the nature of his testimony?
J: This kind of accident could affect a person's life style. Uh, he spoke
with authority; he made a good presence.
I: Do you recall of those two, who at times gave conflicting testimony,
which you thought more credible? Which you were more likely to be-
lieve?
J: Well, as I said in the beginning, I was impressed with Dr. -, with
not necessarily his background-of course, that contributed to it-but
of what he said, and how he said it.
Interestingly, one juror in the same case had a positive opinion about
the expert when he began to present his credentials, but he changed his
overall opinion later:
J: We got really tired of listening to the myriad of publications and
where he had spoken, and who he had talked to. We were willing to
let it go much earlier than that, but he was qualified .... Personalities
just have to come through to some extent. And, at first I was sold on
Dr. -, but, because he did make a good impression, but then they
[the attorneys] went on and on and on [presenting his credentials], I
kind of lost faith in him.
Other jurors also were critical and evaluated this expert in a negative
way. Some offered two reasons: the expert did not have time to actually
practice medicine, and the extensive listing made jurors suspicious:
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J: His credentials were impeccable, but he was on every committee,
and I'm thinking to myself, and everybody else in the jury agreed when
we were talking about it, if he's so good, why isn't he operating, making
money? Why is he on all these committees? This must take too much
of his time. If I was a surgeon like he was, I'd be doing the cutting and
making the money, not being on all these committees.
J: He seemed like he knew a lot about, you know, his area of expertise.
He was a neurologist, a neurosurgeon, but as I said before, the way he
was on every committee and his credentials went on for pages and pages
and they had an inch-thick thing on him-this is what he's done, you
know, he's on every committee, gives speeches all over the place-but
to me it hurt because he's everywhere and he's not doing his job.
J: He presented a long list of credentials stating that he was a specialist.
When somebody starts doing that, it makes me kind of skeptical. When
they start trying to convince us of their honor, we start counting the
spoons.... He spent, I would say, half of his testimony trying, telling
us what made him an expert witness.
I: Do you think his credibility was reduced by the amount of time he
spent talking about himself?
J: Well it makes you skeptical. Probably if he had not tried to impress
as much ...
I: Do you think the plaintiffs or the defendants had better expert testi-
mony?
J: If you just went by credentials, I would say that the plaintiff had a
better expert witness. But credentials are not always, [they don't] always
make for the best interpretations. Just like a kid who's going to college
when they take the SAT test, and that doesn't always tell the capabili-
ties of the child. They may do lousy on the SAT test, and be an excel-
lent student. So, just because he had a pile of credentials didn't make
him good or bad.
It was not always the case that all the factors (e.g., the testimony, cre-
dentials) pointed in the same direction. When factors contradicted, the ju-
rors found it more difficult to judge the relative credibility of conflicting
experts. For example, one juror preferred the credentials of expert A, but
he decided that expert B was more credible because of a better presentation.
In another matter, a juror set off the credentials of two conflicting experts
against their familiarity with the case:
J: They both had long lists of background degrees and training and
experience . . . He just didn't have enough of a background in it to
really be sitting there, other than to be a character witness, saying "I
know this doctor [defendant], he's a good doctor.". . .He hadn't studied
it. This other doctor had studied in depth, like I said, I mean he did
diagrams, he knew all what happened.
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It seemed that jurors experienced a greater challenge when they had
to evaluate the credibility of two conflicting experts with different specializa-
tions, as illustrated in this comment: "Dr. __ is an orthopedic doctor.
Dr. __ is a medical doctor. So, it's two different things. So there's two
different doctors; you really can't compare them too much I don't think."
In summary, jurors definitely used credentials to evaluate the credibility
of an expert witness. They discussed institutional affiliation, specialization,
education, research, and professional activity. Although a long list of cre-
dentials was generally perceived in a positive light, it backfired in at least one
instance, reminiscent of Cooper and Neuhaus's mock jury findings (2000).
Credentials were also used to evaluate credibility in combination with other
categories, such as familiarity with the case or presentation style.
Motives
Jurors tried to reason about the motives that brought each expert to
the witness stand, although the interviewers did not explicitly ask about the
motives. Still, in discussing motives, they rarely mentioned motives that
would enhance one expert's credibility in comparison with another's. In-
stead, they focused primarily on characteristics that reduced an expert's cred-
ibility.
For example, jurors carefully examined and weighed potential motives
for bias. As indicated in figure 1, typical motives were monetary gain, friend-
ship with the attorney or one of the parties, and primarily in medical mal-
practice cases, sympathy with the defendant. The majority of the comments
dealing with motives focused on monetary gain and the effect of payment
on objectivity or bias (see table 2).
Jurors observed that the attorneys tried to discredit the expert of the
opposite party by asking him about the expert's fee. They noted and com-
mented about the (high) fees paid to the expert witnesses:
J: I was very interested also in their fees, which were-it was funny-
they were getting like four hundred dollars an hour. Well not all of
them, but one was getting, two or three were getting four hundred dol-
lars an hour; one was getting two hundred and sixty-five dollars an
hour; and we're saying, you know, "We're getting fifteen dollars a day."
I: Was that true for the doctors on both sides?
J: Yes, yes.
Emphasizing the large fee paid to the experts may not be a winning
tactic all the time; in fact, it may backfire. For example, in one case, the
attorney for the defendant tried to argue that the expert testified just to
secure several thousand dollars worth of medical treatment in the future.
What did one of the jurors conclude? "No, he pursued that so much, he
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tried to discredit him [the expert] so much in that way and everything else
and [it] made - [the attorney] look cheap."
Being paid more did not necessarily discredit one expert over the other,
a result that again reminds us of the Cooper and Neuhaus mock juror results
(2000). In our research, in a case of medical malpractice, the defendant
invited one of his colleagues from the hospital to provide testimony. From
evidence presented in the courtroom, the jurors learned that this expert was
charging only a quarter of his usual fee, so they declared him less credible
than the experts for the plaintiff, who charged more. The perception was
that the defendant's colleague was biased; he was testifying for his friend.
Here the fee interacted with a second motive-friendship.
One juror expressed an overall objection to the fact that expert wit-
nesses were paid. This juror was concerned about "hired gun" expert wit-
nesses:
J: It's that somebody will do it for money. And I think that was the
largest, in my impression, the largest motive pushing the expert wit-
nesses, is money. And that sort of discredited the witnesses, the expert
witnesses toward, for me, well, you know, both sides.... But I did take,
I took that into account. Also, I looked at their evidence that they
presented, which, a lot of it I found interesting and informative.
Similarly, several other jurors shared this general concern about the
objectivity of the expert witnesses' testimony because they were paid. For
example, one juror contrasted two experts and made a decision based on
their motives:
J: Dr. __ seemed like a competent individual, not really trying to,
even though he was a witness for the plaintiff, didn't seem to try to
sway one way or the other, was just trying to state the facts, I guess,
as they were. And was somewhat informative as far as the specific na-
ture of her [plaintiff's] follow-up surgery, and what those complications
or problems were. Dr. - [the other witness] seemed to be more for
the plaintiff as far as her cause and things like that and answers seemed
to be skewed in that way accordingly.
Another juror compared the credibility of expert witnesses to that of
other (unpaid) witnesses. The paid expert did not fare well, largely because
of the financial incentive:
J: [Those two witnesses seemed credible] because they were not expert
witnesses, they weren't being paid for their time. They were volunteer-
ing their time and their eyewitness account of what happened. They're
not going by what the lawyer told them, what they signed, or instant
replay.
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However, not all jurors associated payment with less credibility.
J: The defense only pointed out that these expert witnesses were being
paid for their appearances.
1: And did that influence their credibility?
J: No, I expected them to be awarded for it, the time that they'd spent
in this, researching it and exploring it.
Another juror shared this opinion, but was cautious about the expert
witness who testified frequently:
J: One of the doctors, I remember, was from -, and had been there
for years and was now doing more in consulting type work, and I just
remember, I felt like I was sitting and watching the movie The Verdict.
I mean, because it was a doctor who was semi-retired and ended up
testifying in like 75 cases in the past two years or something like
that.... I mean I didn't see any question or problem with physicians
testifying. I don't see a problem with charging ... for his time to come
in because he'd be charging patients, and so that's what he would
charge anyway, so I found it credible and I didn't have a problem with
all the other questions.
In another case, the attorney mentioned that the expert witness for
the opposite party had testified in a number of similar cases. Jurors discred-
ited experts who appeared in a number of similar cases with the same attor-
ney: "The defense attorney brought out that 95% of this guy's income is
just testifying in asbestos cases all over the United States, and then you felt
like he had a racket." Jurors interpreted that information as a reason that
undermined their credibility ("I guess the guy makes spare pocket change
by doing extra witnessing").
Clearly, motives were an important category, and they were mentioned
by at least one juror in each case in the sample. For example, even when
most jurors liked a medical doctor's testimony and described her as a very
good expert witness, her involvement in previous cases became a problem
in the eyes of some jurors: "She was strictly a plaintiff's doctor":
J: Dr. , boy, we were waiting for her to come, because we kept
hearing about her, all before she came, so the big day she came, she
was on that stand all day long .... We really felt like she was really
into her work and stuff until she came out and said, "Well, yes, I've
examined 300 of [the attorney's) clients" . . . . And you're thinking,
"Well, gosh, does she have a racket going?". . . She was pretty interest-
ing and stuff. She seemed pretty straightforward and would go through
the X rays and her findings and stuff, but, I don't know, you just felt
like she maybe was having a racket with this attorney. I mean, I felt
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like she was a good doctor and knew what she was doing, but, yeah,
she kind of had a racket going.
The second case in which jurors compared two categories-motives and
testimony-was the asbestos case. After discussing the content of the testi-
mony, a juror concluded that, although one expert had delivered a good presen-
tation, and was generally liked by the jury, he was discredited because he had
been an expert witness in a number of other cases handled by the same attorney.
A juror in another case was faced with a similar situation: He needed to evalu-
ate the testimony given by an expert who had testified quite frequently in
medical malpractice suits. His evaluation was quite different:
1: Did you have any questions about his credibility, given that he testi-
fied quite frequently and was being paid a lot of money?
J: Not really because he had good credentials, and I didn't question his
credibility.
The majority of the jurors who commented on monetary motives attrib-
uted a negative connotation to them and questioned the potential objectiv-
ity of the expert witnesses. This was a typical comment: "He was definitely
being paid by the plaintiffs. He was very one-sided and . . . he was there
testifying for the plaintiff."
In a medical malpractice case, the defendant invited an expert witness
to testify, and jurors heard during the trial that this expert witness had been
involved in a medical malpractice case himself. We might expect that the
jurors would be skeptical of his testimony, but interestingly, not all jurors were:
J: It was mentioned that his [defendant's] expert witness also had been
involved in a malpractice case at one time.
I: Did that diminish his credibility?
J: No. I don't think it did.
Friendship was another potential source of motivation to provide ex-
pert testimony. As noted above, one expert witness in a medical malpractice
case was a colleague of the defendant. Jurors noticed that both of them had
worked in the same hospital, and they attached different consequences to
it. The majority of jurors discredited the expert, stating that he was a friend
of the defendant. One juror was asked how he would evaluate the credibility
of the expert if the expert were an outsider who said the same thing. The
juror confirmed that he would judge it differently, supporting the general
opinion that being a friend with one of the parties or attorneys in the case
limited the credibility of an expert witness.
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I: Was the credibility of Dr. __'s testimony diminished by the fact
that he was a colleague of Dr. - [the defendant in a medical mal-
practice suit]?
J: I believe so.
I: If he had been an outsider who had said that, you might have found
it more credible?
J: Yes. I thought that he was biased in that opinion. And that it was
also brought out that he treated or thought of Dr. - [the defendant]
like a son. And that was mentioned on more than one occasion, and
it wasn't denied either, or refuted.
J: I only remember one guy who made some testimony. He was very
much a good friend of Dr. - [the defendant in a medical malprac-
tice suit] and, I think, was testifying on his behalf. And the only part
of his testimony, I guess his whole testimony, was brought into question
when the plaintiff's attorney made some points to the fact that
Dr. __ had agreed to testify before seeing all the components of the
case.
I: Which led you to think...
J: That he agreed to testify on someone's behalf without knowing why
it was he was testifying, or whether he was actually in fact testifying
for somebody that he should have been out there supporting from a
medical standpoint.
I: So this is more, perhaps, more out of friendship than out of medical
agreement?
J: Yeah, right, exactly.
I: So did that lessen the importance of what he was saying?
J: Oh certainly, certainly, certainly it did.
In sum, it seems that jurors' thoughts about or discussions of the experts'
motives usually had a negative impact on credibility. Motives discussed by
jurors can be classified as monetary gain, hired guns, sympathy toward the
defendant, and friendship with the defendant. If jurors raised the issue of
an expert's motives, they typically found a serious concern that impacted
on the expert's credibility.
General Impressions of Expert Witnesses
Jurors made a number of highly detailed comments about expert wit-
nesses that were outside the categories of credibility, credentials, and motive.
We call this category "general impressions of expert witnesses," and it in-
cludes comments about age ("He was an older doctor"), race ("He was a
black physician"), gender ("the lady doctor"), nationality ("I believe he was
the Irishman"), physical appearance ("He's a tall man with blonde hair,
wasn't he?"), and dress of expert witnesses ("One of them wore bowties.
Which one was that?"). Either these factors did not influence jurors' judg-
HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry  468 2003
Jurors' Evaluations of Expert Testimony 469
ment about credibility, or they did not want to tell the interviewer that
they made a difference.
Other factors in this general category include the expert's personality
and attitude, as well as any personal acquaintance with the expert, and ju-
rors' judgments about these factors did appear to influence their assessment
of expert credibility. Manner of speech, an element that also can be catego-
rized as "presentation style," was important ("he was very well-versed"). As
one juror said, "We all got a big kick out of him because he was neat to
listen to." Most jurors who emphasized the personality of the expert (such
as intelligence, sense of humor) found that credibility was in fact aided by
personal factors. Even a juror who found an expert arrogant displayed no
overall negative impression ("even though he came off as being a little bit
arrogant, he was believable"). Some jurors used the term attitude to identify
the expert's personal style or personality. One juror linked the expert's per-
sonality and attitude, saying: "I didn't care for this Dr. __ I didn't care
for his personality, his attitude ... but that didn't sway me one way or the
other."
A juror's personal acquaintance with an expert, or some knowledge
about the expert that was not obtained during the trial, such as general
reputation of the expert, could influence the assessment of credibility in
either a positive or negative light. For example, in one case, an expert's
credibility was bolstered by the fact that the expert was a doctor who had
treated one juror's mother. However, another juror in the same case per-
ceived the media publicity of a prior sexual harassment case filed against
the expert as a negative factor in assessing the expert's credibility.
In summary, jurors discussed general impressions of the experts, but
they related only some of these impressions to credibility (e.g., those involv-
ing the personality of the expert and his or her attitude), while some others
(e.g., gender or dress of the expert) were not related to their evaluations of
credibility in an explicit way.
Testimony Factors
Testimony factors, or evaluations about the "message," may be divided
into those involving the presentation style and those involving the content
of the expert witness testimony. As reported below, both were crucial in
evaluations of expert witness credibility.
Presentation Style
Jurors not only judged experts as individuals; they also attended to their
presentation of technical material during testimony. Consistent with re-
search such as that of Jacoubovitch et al. (1977), which showed a preference
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for direct testimony over mediated testimony, jurors far preferred live testi-
mony by experts over the reading of depositions: "The depositions were
sometimes hard to follow. I don't know if that was just loss of attention
when they were reading 176 pages." They were particularly negative about
generic depositions: "I felt like they went to him just for this specific case.
I would have listened to it more, but I just felt like this was just a run-of-
the-mill one."
Jurors' assessments appeared to be influenced by how experts presented
their information. Clarity of presentation was critically important. Most of
the jurors emphasized it, viewing it as an important part of the expert's
credibility. It seems that the best expert witness comes across as a very good
teacher-someone who knows how to make a presentation:
J: Dr. __ was incredibly interesting. I mean, if you can get an educa-
tion, this man was wonderful. He explained things to you; you under-
stood what he was talking about. He was very clear, as a matter of fact,
when he would get up and demonstrate something .... He was very,
very good, he knew exactly, he seemed to know exactly what he was
talking about. He was very believable.
J: He was extremely knowledgeable.... The way he explained things
to the jury and to the courtroom, we all understand perfectly. He would
have been a great teacher. He explained everything great. He was the
best witness they had. They couldn't have [done] better.
Jurors felt more comfortable and regarded experts as good when they
adjusted their vocabulary for a lay audience during the presentation. Jurors
appreciated explanations given in less technical terms: "He explained every-
thing to us, in terms we would understand."
Furthermore, they did not have a lot of mercy for experts whose focus
of testimony was boring or unclear: "There were times when the testimony
was very dull and technical, and you might have a tendency to, your mind
would wander. You'd have a tendency to want to doze off."
Jurors appreciated the use of some forms of technical aid as part of the
expert's presentation, whether it was a model, chart, diagram, or X ray.
J: Dr. __ was here from - [local town], and he was very good.
His point was well taken. He had a lot of details, a lot of X rays to
show, to help you understand why he had made the decisions that he
had made.
J: And they went through, made diagrams on the chalkboard, the inter-
nal structures in the woman, you know, and what was done, exactly
what was done and things like that. So, I don't think that it was very,
that hard to understand.
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Similarly, for testimony where the presentation pace was tedious ("he
was going date after date after date"), or when the presentation was too long
for the jurors, the jurors found it to be challenging: "Dr. -, he went on
and on and on. He was there for I bet an hour, at least. Some of them kind
of get sing-song. Of course, it was long, just sitting, sitting." In addition to
good pacing and brevity, jurors valued directness and enthusiasm. An expert
witness who did not hesitate to answer the questions, who "didn't beat
around the bush," was liked better. In the asbestos case, one plaintiff was
apparently on the borderline of asbestosis, and some experts said that he
had asbestosis, while other experts disagreed. One juror particularly liked
the expert who just said that the defendant was a borderline case. The juror
interpreted the expert's statement as objective, and regarded that expert as
credible: "He was extremely good, believable, particularly in the one in-
stance somebody was a borderline, and he just said, he said, 'It's a border-
line."'
By contrast, evasive expert witnesses were not appreciated:
J: He seemed real evasive sometimes. Like when the attorney would
ask him certain questions, he would like try to get around it, start giving
you big explanations for something you didn't even want to know.
That's all I really got to say about him. He wasn't too believable at all.
Jurors saw experts with a range of specialties and skills at presenting
substantive issues. The quality of presentation appeared to affect the jurors'
ability to understand the issues:
I: Did you find any of the evidence difficult to understand?
J: In this particular case?
I: Yes, in this case.
J: Yes, some. It depended on the witness. Now, some of the witnesses
were, they hit the whole spectrum. They went from earth-type person
all the way up the scale to biochem, uh bio, what's the term they used?
I know it's his title. It's biomechanical engineer. And this particular
guy, that's what he lived on, data. Everything was data, pretty much.
He was trying to make graphs out of data.
Occasionally, jurors compared two factors or categories. For some ex-
perts, a good presentation style was compared to some other factors, such
as motives. In one medical malpractice case, a medical expert described the
procedure that the defendant should have followed, and he presented facts
clearly and objectively, according to the jurors. They liked his presentation
style so much that they did not consider him biased when he became emo-
tional about what had happened to the plaintiff as a result of medical mal-
practice.
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J: He was very believable. I mean, to the extent that at one point he
almost became emotional about what had happened. It was like, "How
could you do this? How could you damage this man's life?" You know.
And you believed that that's exactly what he believed happened. That
this Dr. - [the defendant] just did not care. He went in and did it,
and he just did it.
J: Dr. __ was probably the witness that decided the case for the
plaintiff.... He was a very good witness. He spent a lot of time dis-
cussing embolisms and infarcts, and actually he became quite emotional
when certain questions were asked. You could tell that his sincere opin-
ion was that this procedure was totally unnecessary and that it was
malpractice on Dr. - [the defendant's] part not to have picked up
on the fact that it was an embolism.
Thus, jurors noticed the way the testimony was given and the facts
presented, and they preferred clear presentation in lay terms, paced well,
not too long, given enthusiastically, and supported with technical aids. As
the malpractice case just cited suggests, a good quality presentation may
help to counteract problematic motives.
Content of Testimony
Although jurors are frequently accused of being unable to understand
the content of testimony and consequently resorting to more subjective fac-
tors when judging an expert's credibility, jurors in this study often remarked
about the content of the testimony. Some gave short summaries of what
the expert had said; others discussed the details of the testimony. In a worker
injury case in which a scaffold had collapsed, the expert testified about the
building of the scaffold and safety procedures. One juror summarized his
statement using the following words:
J: He just sat there with a monotone voice and just told us exactly what
pump jack scaffolding was. Exactly how it was to be used. Exactly what
kind of wood it was supposed to be used with. How many nails were
supposed to be in each board. How far apart the nails were supposed
to be in each board. How you were supposed to check and make sure
that the board had nothing wrong with it.
Similarly, a juror in a negligence case discussed the content of the ex-
pert testimony:
J: He gave us all the figures on how long this young man's going to
live, what it's gonna cost to take care of him, what his medical bills
have been. He explained how, if we were to find in this boy's favor,
how we're to determine exactly, how to convert tomorrow's dollars to
today's dollars, and things like that.
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I: Did you find that helpful, when the time came?
J: Yes, yes.
I: So, he generally was a credible witness?
J: Yes he was.
The majority of the jurors tried to critically evaluate content. One fac-
tor they considered was consistency: "Both of the doctors for the defense,
they were completely unbelievable. Their testimony differed so much from
their deposition. They took like half a day each, almost a day at a time, for
each of them, because there were so many differences in the thing; they kept
bringing that up." This shows that the common litigator tactic of pointing
to differences between deposition and trial testimony can be effective in
decreasing credibility.
Jurors also looked for points of the testimony that seemed illogical or
wrong, based on their own knowledge. In one case, where an economist was
called to suggest how to calculate the award, jurors used their experience
to evaluate the testimony. The expert made rather generous assumptions
about the pension the plaintiff would have earned if he were healthy and
could work until old age, but it contradicted jurors' personal knowledge of
pensions in the state.
J: It just doesn't make any sense, of what the people were earning, and
what they could earn and so forth. Hell, I knew what people earn
at - [the organization where the plaintiff worked]. I knew what
all their pensions were. The numbers they were putting up there were
ridiculous.
The jurors thus compared their collective fund of information with the
expert's testimony. When they found a discrepancy, the jurors used expert
testimony as a jumping-off point, adjusting the figures as they thought appro-
priate.
Completeness of testimony was important to jurors also. They viewed
experts who explained everything that appeared to be important to the case
as believable. Conversely, experts who omitted some significant parts of the
explanation were perceived as less credible.
The complexity of the testimony and the jurors' ability to understand
it also played a significant role in how jurors responded to experts. Not sur-
prisingly, jurors reported more problems with testimony that was technically
complex: "They got quite technical in a lot of the medical instances, and
so, overall, just generally speaking, I could understand what they were say-
ing. Still, a lot of the technical got pretty, got pretty deeply in."
In one case, an economist testified about the award, and one juror com-
mented, "I understood what he was trying to do, but as far as him arriving
at the figures and all, I didn't comprehend." In general terms, then, use of
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the expert witnesses involves an essential paradox: Jurors, who are lay peo-
ple, need to understand and evaluate unfamiliar issues. Several jurors recog-
nized the problem:
J: There was an awful lot that I couldn't understand because, well that's
true with everything. You know, if.you're not a major in music-if you
don't major in music and you major in some other subject-and some-
body gets up and starts telling you all of these technical things about
the G clef and the half notes and tone qualities and all that sort of
thing, it's not going to mean very much to you and you're not going to
understand much of what's they're saying. And that's just the same way
with these categories. These men were experts in the field of pressure.
I: His testimony was hard for you to understand?
J: Basically because of the fact that I know nothing about construction.
I know nothing about medical terms or legal terms, which the doctors
talked medical stuff that I didn't understand. The lawyers with their
long words for short definitions.
J: We were a cross-section of the lay public, and we didn't know that
much about asbestos and asbestosis, prior to the trial, and I believe
everybody was educated to a great degree by the presentations of the
experts that the plaintiffs and the defense brought in.
J: And it was so dry, you know, and so cut and dry, and naturally I
didn't understand what scientific reasons why, what force and velocity
... that would cause, and all these things. This is what they talked
about a lot. All these kinds of things.
The interviewers routinely asked jurors, "Was there any evidence that
was difficult for the jury to understand?" In response, jurors reported that
the way in which complex testimony was presented affected whether they
had trouble comprehending the evidence.
J: I think had it not been explained as well as it was, yeah, perhaps it
would have been, you know... there are certain things that I wouldn't
have understood. There were medical terms used that I would not have
understood. However, they were explained in detail.
J: No. When they explained it, they explained it in language that we
understood, and they used diagrams and pictures. They were very simple
to understand.
J: They were a good reference, because there was so much written and
verbal argument, and times, and circumstances, places, impacts, and
feelings-a lot of technical data. I mean, you had to be an engineer
to understand a lot of this stuff. And they try to make it as plain and
as clear as they could for us.
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Clarity and repetition, as the following juror emphasized, played a cru-
cial role: "they explained it-they went over it often enough that they ex-
plained it really well-so I didn't find anything really too difficult to
understand." When asked whether any medical testimony was difficult to
understand, the same juror answered: "No, they explained it pretty well."
Similar comments were made by a number of other jurors.
J: He seemed to be a very competent doctor. His testimony was on
videotape, and I was impressed with the way he matter of factly pre-
sented the extent of damage and explained in layman's terms what the
damage was.
I: So he made the medical testimony understandable.
J: Yes, he did.
If the experts used complicated professional jargon, lay jurors had a
more challenging task.
I: Was any of the evidence either for the plaintiff or the defense hard
to understand?
J: Well, they would bring up pleural plaques, and then they had another
phrase that meant the same thing, and they were using that intermit-
tently, and until we got that straightened out, it was a little bit hard
to understand.
I: So you, I guess, had a hard time, then, reading the X rays and inter-
preting them independently?
J: Yeah, and a lot of the medical talk .... It was like, speak English.
Put it in layman's terms.
J: It seemed to me that they made the effort, knowing that we weren't
of the medical background, to explain terminology whenever it seemed
to be a foreign language.
I: And you felt pretty comfortable with the medical evidence?
J: Yes.
Furthermore, when used, various technical aids generally improved the
clarity of the experts' presentations and helped jurors better understand the
subject matter. For example, some experts used pictures, charts, diagrams,
X rays, or models. When asked whether the medical evidence was difficult
to understand, one juror remarked, "A lot of it was medical terms, and they
had a chart showing how the bones worked, what causes backlash [witness
speaks of whiplash] when you go forward and back. That was helpful. Mostly
we could understand it."
Sometimes, to clearly present the major points of the testimony, experts
needed to cut out the details. Jurors preferred clear explanations of impor-
tant points over detailed explanations. One juror said, "I could basically
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handle most of it. A lot of it you had to weed out the details to get to the
level of information that you needed to know."
Overall, then, jurors' comments show that a good, clear presentation
can make complex testimony more understandable, as can terminology that
is appropriate for a lay audience. The ability of experts to "speak English"
and translate technical concepts into lay terms makes complex testimony
more useful during the deliberation.
Although jurors did not usually have substantive knowledge of the ex-
pert's subject (which is, of course, the formal reason for inviting an expert
to testify), most of them developed some impression about the knowledge
of the field displayed by the expert and commented on it-for example,
"He knew a lot about his area of expertise," or "I thought he knew what
he was talking about," or "I thought he was a good surgeon. He evidently
was a good surgeon. He knew what he was doing. I got that impression."
One juror made the following point, however: "It seemed to me that he
knew what he was talking. If he didn't know what he was talking about,
you know, I couldn't have told, have been able to tell."
Some jurors were in a better position to understand testimony than the
others, because they were at least partially familiar with the subject matter.
Those jurors reportedly turned out to be very important during the delibera-
tions. In the case with the collapsing scaffold, jurors had problems under-
standing complex issues of building and safety. One juror emphasized the
importance of being familiar with the subject: "There were some guys [other
jurors] that knew about construction, and they would try to make it clear
for the rest of us exactly how it looked."
We've already seen that jurors attempt to deal with opposing experts
by comparing their credentials. Similarly, they tried to resolve conflicting
expert testimony by contrasting motives and the substantive aspects of the
testimony. Jurors might also compare an expert's conclusions to some other
evidence in the case, such as medical tests, X rays, or the testimony of a
lay witness. For example, in the asbestos case, expert testimony about the
correct results of medical tests was contradictory. Thus, jurors averaged the
scores of both tests and found an effective, if not accurate, way of circum-
venting the problem of conflicting testimony.
J: We would write-that's when we made our charts, you know-we'd
write it down and we'd compare. But they all did the same tests. And
we'd just compare what levels these people had and come to an average.
I: Of all the doctors?
J: Yeah ...
I: Okay, so, you kind of averaged their scores, his scores together, to
get something?
J: Yeah, yeah.
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Several jurors explained the other methods they used to decide whom
to believe in a case of conflicting expert witnesses. Some said that they
relied on their intelligence, watched body language, and/or tried to use other
psychological tricks:
I: How did you deal with that conflict?
J: Where I could, I used experience and knowledge that I had. Where
I couldn't, which was more the case than otherwise, I went on the level
of detail that the person had, the train of thought the person carried,
the confidence with which the person gave their answers, the willing-
ness to field any defending questions without belligerence, you know,
with a degree of confidence, saying, "I know what I'm talking about."
And, that's basically how I did it. I didn't know any other way.
J: Just being relatively intelligent you can tell who's trying to sway you,
or who's trying to sell you their own idea versus what's the truth.
I: How'd you try to figure out, when you had the two doctors that dis-
puted each other, which one was right?
J: You can tell when they lie.
I: You can tell? How do you tell?
J: I don't know. If you look at people and study people, there's some-
thing you can find out, you know, from the get-go about them. ...
People will pay you and sway you to do things.
I: Do you think that was happening in this case?
J: Yes.
I: Do you look for anything in the way they speak, or is it more what
they say?
J: You look for the way they speak. You look for the eyeg. You look for
the movements. You look to see how much nerve. If they go like this,
or rock like this, the witness. If he rocks like this and the other lawyer
asks him a question, and he'll make like he don't understand the ques-
tion. Then they're wishy-washy.
In summary, when jurors examined the content of testimony, they con-
sidered its completeness, consistency, and complexity. To better understand
the complex expert witness testimony and soften the "essential paradox" of
the expert testimony, they relied on presentation style. Thus, jurors dis-
cussed the relationship between presentation style (or its elements, such as
clarity or use of technical aids) and the understandability of evidence, and
they emphasized that everything else being equal, the clearer the presenta-
tion, the better they understood the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Expert testimony plays an important role in civil litigation; in many
cases, it is the dominant component. Unlike jurors in a typical criminal
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case, jurors sitting in a civil case frequently encounter not only one but
several-usually conflicting-presentations of expert testimony (Gross
1991; Krafka et al. 2002). Thus, they face a paradox: Jurors routinely need
to evaluate expert evidence in order to make their decisions, yet their exper-
tise with respect to the evidence is usually limited. Our research addresses
the question of how jurors approach the challenge of this essential paradox
of expert testimony.
To date, relevant answers to this question have been limited. Reliable
data on how expert evidence is received and used are scarce. Although ex-
pert testimony is the subject of extensive attention from scholars, judges,
and lawyers, existing research on jurors and experts has mostly focused on
determining comprehension problems. Mock juror and jury studies, limited
in their implications by their methodology, have inquired about the ways
jurors react to specific types of expert evidence, such as statistical evidence,
battered women syndrome evidence, or eyewitness-identification evidence.
By contrast, there has been relatively little research examining jurors' reac-
tions to two of the most frequent types of expert evidence-medical and
economic expert evidence.
The research reported in this article examined actual jurors' reactions
to expert witnesses by providing jurors with an opportunity to describe their
experiences in a semi-structured interview setting. We analyzed transcripts
of interviews with jurors in a variety of civil cases (ranging from workplace-
injury cases to medical-malpractice cases) involving a number of expert wit-
nesses in each case. Although this method is not without its inherent meth-
odological challenges, as described earlier, the data provide a unique and
complementary perspective to prior research. By systematically studying the
factors the jurors reported focusing on while assessing expert evidence, we
have developed a fuller and more detailed model of expert witness credibility.
The questionnaire results showed that most jurors expressed some reser-
vations about the experts at the outset, rather than accepting expert asser-
tions uncritically, as is often supposed. The American legal system,
adversarial in nature, rests on the assumption that the decision maker has
a passive role and the parties build their cases (and, consequently, hire ex-
perts to support their arguments). Although the nuances may escape them,
jurors seem cognizant of the broad adversarial pressures on experts. They
expressed worry or disdain for those experts who testified frequently, espe-
cially once the opposing attorney raised questions about frequency and the
amounts of money received by the expert as compensation.
Vidmar's (1995) work on juries in medical malpractice cases also
reached the conclusion that juries consider the adversarial context in assess-
ing expert credibility. The disapproval that jurors in our study expressed
about expert witnesses perceived to be hired guns, or about experts who
were close friends with the defendants in medical malpractice cases, is also
consistent with other research (e.g., American Bar Association Special
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Committee of Jury Comprehension 1989; Sanders 1993; Cooper and Neu-
haus 2000). By acknowledging the adversarial context and the potential
motives of expert witnesses, jurors reflect a more sophisticated and less naive
view of legally provided expertise than might have formerly been appreci-
ated. Interestingly, jurors show some of the same predilection to question
expert motivation as the Supreme Court justices do in Kumho Tire (1999).
Sanders, Diamond, and Vidmar (2002) argue that opinions in the Kumho
Tire case reflect a judicial concern for adversarial pressures that may affect
the content and credibility of expert testimony.
In several other ways, our findings converge with empirical research
conducted using divergent methodological approaches. For example, the
findings on importance of clarity and accessibility of testimony for a lay
audience confirm the results of earlier studies on juries and experts (Ameri-
can Bar Association Special Committee of jury Comprehension 1989; Sand-
ers 1993; Champagne et al. 1992; Shuman et al. 1994) as well as the broad
conclusions of research on jury comprehension of legal instructions (Tiersma
1999).
In surveys by Shuman and his colleagues (see, for example, Shuman
et al. 1994, 1996a, 1996b), some participants believed that jurors focus
mainly on the personal characteristics of the expert. We found, however,
that making a decision about the expert's credibility, jurors examined both
personal characteristics of the messenger (credentials, motives, and general
impressions) and dimensions of the message (presentation style and con-
tent ).
That said, the factors jurors identified as most important were not iden-
tical for each case, each expert witness, or each juror. It would have been
interesting to explore whether the complexity of the evidence affected the
factors that jurors mentioned most frequently. Such research could use real
jurors to test the Cooper et al. (1996) proposal that jurors confronted with
difficult testimony shift from central processing to peripheral processing and
rely more heavily on shortcuts such as credentials. We had insufficient num-
bers of cases to examine this hypothesis.
Of interest to scholars and practitioners alike, jurors clearly agreed
about the characteristics that led them to evaluate an expert as highly credi-
ble. Such experts were generally described as good teachers with sound cre-
dentials and acceptable motives. Further, the juror model of expert
credibility that we developed using a grounded theory approach overlaps
substantially with the factors that judges and lawyers identify as characteris-
tic of good experts (Chesler, Sanders, and Kalmuss 1988). In interviews with
lawyers and social scientists in desegregation cases, Chesler et al. (1988)
asked what factors made expert witnesses more credible. In a notable conver-
gence with our juror data, the majority focused on the skills and tactics
of presentation and style. Significant minorities of lawyers and scientists
emphasized technical knowledge or expertise such as good credentials, good
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data, or good experience, and knowledge of the local area. Indeed, in assess-
ing credibility, although the frequencies differed to a degree, both lawyers
and scientists most often mentioned the experts' ability to communicate
clearly and specifically, to maintain integrity and neutrality, and to avoid
being adversarial. Considering our juror data and the Chesler et al. (1988)
results together, we are struck by the similarities between the juror model
of expert credibility and the model of expert credibility held by legal and
scientific experts.
In closing, we note that from the point of view of the lawyers, expert
witnessing may be characterized as a "performance." Lawyers commission
and direct these presentations. The determinants of the performance begin
with the lawyer's choice of a performer (casting) and proceed to the content
of the testimony (script) and the manner of presentation (staging). If these
efforts are successful, the audience's perceptions of the messenger and the
message unite to form their reaction to a performance that is designed to
have a specific impact-like the intertwining of character and plot in a play.
As we learn more about how jurors respond to experts, it is worthwhile to
keep in mind that the dimensions of expert performance are chosen and
created with the aim of influencing jury decision making. Arguably, one
important function of adversarial cross-examination is to help jurors pull
back the curtain on the performance of an expert witness. Research that
examines the relative effects of credentials, motives, presentation style, and
content on expert credibility may show more fully how jurors judge the
expert performance presented to them.
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